The Cuban economy by Ibarra, David & Máttar, Jorge
T E P I L 
,R E V I E W, 
N U M B E R 66 
D E C E M B E R 1 998 
S A N T I A G O , C H I L E 
O S C A R A L T I M I R 
Director of the Review 
E U G E N I O L A H E R A 
Technical Secretary 
UNITED NATIONS 
C E P A L R E V I E W 66 
C O N T E N T S 
Beyond the Washington Consensus: an ECLAC perspective 
Jose Antonio Ocampo 
The Cuban economy 
David Ibarra and Jorge Máttar 
Education in Latin America: demand and distribution are 
factors that matter 
Nancy Birdsall, Juan Luis Londoño and Lesley O'Connett 
Determinants of Inequality among urban households 
Luis Felipe Jiménez L. and Nora Ruedi A. 
Health management contracts in Costa Rica from a 
comparative perspective 
Ana Sojo 
A development strategy founded on natural resource-based 
production clusters 
Joseph Ramos 
Big Latin American industrial companies and groups 
Celso Garrido and Wilson Peres 
Between political control and efficiency gains: 
the evolution of agrarian property rights in Mexico 
Gustavo Gorditto, Alain de Janvry and Elizabeth Sadoulet 
Tariffs and the Piano Real In Brazil 










Recent ECLAC publications 189 
D E C E M B E R 1 996 





Adviser to the Director, 
ECLAC Subregional 
Headquarters in Mexico. 
Jorge Máttar 
Regional Adviser on 
Economic Development, 
ECLAC Subregional 
Headquarters in Mexico. 
At the end of the 1950s, Cuba's economic structure was marked 
by serious technological lags and insufficient industrial devel-
opment. The growth rates of production and investment were 
low, while income distribution displayed a notable bias towards 
concentration. Over the period from 1959 to 1989, the product 
grew at an average rate of around 4% per year and economic 
policy gave the State a leading role in the production of goods 
and services, with a marked predominance of planning over the 
market mechanisms in the regulation of economic activity. In 
this stage, the economy underwent far-reaching changes in its 
production bases, although many of the typical shortcomings of 
the Socialist countries were repeated: over-dimensioned pro-
jects, incorporation of obsolete or obsolescent technologies, and 
neglect of competitiveness. Thus, for three decades Cuba was 
on the sidelines of the enormous changes which were taking 
place in Western markets. Under its arrangements with the So-
cialist countries, the country enjoyed guaranteed markets for its 
exports, favourable terms of trade (although rather less so in the 
1980s) and generous financing for its balance of payments. Al-
beit with flagrant cases of inefficiency, Cuba increased its stock 
of capital goods and expanded its physical infrastructure; in-
creased the capacity of its dams; modernized its railway system, 
and built expressways, highways and rural roads. Progress was 
made in the electrification of the country, and heavy invest-
ments were made in the development of human resources, espe-
cially in the areas of health, education, culture and sport. The 
high social content of the economic policy made possible sub-
stantial advances in the provision of basic services for the popu-
lation and the training of an increasingly skilled labour force. 
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I 
Recent economic evolution 
The entry of the Cuban economy into the Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) at the begin-
ning of the 1970s gave rise to a period of faster 
economic growth than in previous periods, largely fur-
thered by heavy net transfers of external resources.1 
After the disappearance of the CMEA, Cuba be-
gan the 1990s with structural restrictions on its incor-
poration into Western trade. The State still controls 
much of economic activity, on both the supply and 
the demand side, the currency is not convertible, and 
the external linkages with the former CMEA countries 
have still not been completely broken. All this ex-
plains the special features of the production structure 
and distortions in relative prices compared with those 
prevailing in the market economies. Moreover, in the 
new circumstances efforts to achieve distributive ob-
jectives and make progress in the social field give 
rise to heavy burdens which are beginning to exceed 
the capacity of the national economy. 
Cuba's need to adjust its economy to the new 
external circumstances is similar to the situation 
faced by other Latin American economies in the 
1980s, with the difference that in the Cuban case the 
period of adjustment is shorter and the constraints are 
greater. Thus, in 1993 the country embarked on an 
adjustment programme centered, as is usual, on two 
main elements: a macroeconomic stabilization effort 
and liberalization in the areas of production, finance 
and trade. Unlike what happened in the rest of Latin 
America and in the European economies, however, 
the reform process did not include a significant priva-
tization component and incorporated deliberate deci-
0 This article is based on La economía cubana: reformas 
estructurales y desempeño en los noventa (The Cuban economy: 
structural reforms and performance in the 1990s) (ECLAC, 
1997), and on the presentation of that study made by David 
Ibarra at the Fondo de Cultura Económica in March 1998. 
1
 Many of the economic statistics for Cuba are open to question 
because until very recently they used methods of calculation 
different from those recommended by the United Nations. Fur-
thermore, there are shortcomings due to the intrinsic lack of 
information (on prices, for example), the change in the system of 
national accounts (from the system of material product account-
ing to the standard United Nations system) and limitations of 
access in sensitive areas for reasons of national security (in the 
case of foreign investment and the external debt, for example). 
sions to pursue equity in sharing out the burden of the 
change of strategy. 
An idea of the magnitude of the recessionary ad-
justments made may be gained from the fact that the 
product fell by 35% in real terms between 1989 and 
1993, which was the year when the crisis reached its 
height. In this period, total consumption contracted 
by 13%, with family consumption going down by a 
similar proportion. Capital formation slumped from 
24% to less than 6% of the product, while the fiscal 
deficit rose from 6.7% to 30.4% of GDP. Balance of 
payments capital account income went down to less 
than one-tenth (from US$ 4122 million to US$ 404 
million), forcing an adjustment in the trade and pay-
ments balances. Finally, real wages went down by 
around 18%. 
From 1993 onwards, the combination of signifi-
cant stabilization efforts and the rearrangement of 
some structural changes has begun to put the econ-
omy on a sounder basis and bring about changes in 
its traditional forms of operation. Short-term strategic 
planning has undoubtedly made substantial progress, 
although the country is still far from completing more 
far-reaching changes. More specifically, the economy 
has begun -albeit with some fits and starts-- a recov-
ery phase in which annual growth rates averaged 
3.4% between 1993 and 1997. Over the same four 
years, the imbalance in the public accounts went 
down to only 2% of GDP; monetary liquidity went 
down from 67% to around 40% of the product; ex-
ports and imports doubled, and the situation with re-
gard to the parallel exchange rate improved, with the 
rate going down from an average of 78 pesos per 
dollar in 1993 to 19 pesos in 1996, a little over 20 in 
1997, and 19 in March 1998. 
Despite this progress, the full recovery of the 
Cuban economy requires the reactivation and greater 
competitiveness of the sugar industry, which is cur-
rently in a very unfavourable situation and has ad-
verse effects on both the external and fiscal accounts, 
since the latter are affected by the subsidies that the 
industry absorbs. Sugar production also serves as a 
guarantee for obtaining foreign credits, which are of 
decisive importance for dealing with the shortage of 
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foreign exchange suffered by the country. In the pre-
sent economic situation, it might be thought that the 
slump in oil prices might reverse the unfavourable 
II 
In 1989, the sudden dissolution of its very special 
linkages with the Socialist countries forced Cuba to 
make profound reforms in its economy and to change 
the rules previously governing its social life. Unlike 
what happened in a number of Eastern European 
countries, the decisive pressures for change were 
probably not associated with ideologies or para-
digms, embraced by the bulk of the population, 
which were in opposition to the official line. 
Right from the start of the crisis, it was decided 
to spread its burden evenly, and a complex system of 
measures was adopted to facilitate the readaptation of 
production and recover the basic macroeconomic bal-
ances. The economic policy responses to the new 
situation began to be applied in 1993 with the imple-
mentation of a broad programme of adjustment and 
structural change. Subsidies to enterprises were 
slashed; capital expenditure was kept at very low lev-
els; special taxes were approved, and rationing of im-
ports and a partial freeze on prices and wages were 
applied in a sort of incomes policy. Although mone-
tary policy continued to be of a passive nature, the 
government legalized the parallel market and the pos-
session of foreign currency and set up a network of 
shops to recover foreign exchange, thus encouraging 
an increase in remittances from abroad, which helped 
to relieve supply shortages. 
The State continues to play an important role in 
production and resource allocation, with strict regula-
tions on investments and the management of scarce 
foreign currency and inputs. Central planning has 
gradually given way to more indirect controls, how-
ever, especially at the macroeconomic level. The re-
form process has advanced on various fronts and 
must continue to do so if it is desired to consolidate 
the changes designed to adapt the economy and soci-
ety to an external environment which has undergone 
considerable changes. In this respect, it must be ac-
trends in the terms of trade, but the decline in the 
international prices of sugar and nickel tends to wipe 
out this effect. 
knowledged that the adaptations have mainly been of 
a domestic nature, but the speed and even the direc-
tion of some changes are related with the possibility 
of easing the external conditions which keep the 
country on the sidelines of financial markets and 
many trade flows. 
A "second economy" has arisen and gradually 
become more consolidated with the formation of 
mixed-capital enterprises, the granting of manage-
ment autonomy to export enterprises, and the in-
crease in the number of actors in the liberalized 
markets. These departures from the system of 
centralized planning have given rise to a new wave of 
reforms which have altered the fiscal and financial 
structures and have led to the establishment of 
indirect State controls of a macroeconomic and 
micro-economic nature. 
1. The external sector 
The backbone of the structural reform process is the 
effort to rebuild external economic relations in order 
to overcome the external bottleneck and the very 
severe contraction of the economy. It should be noted 
here that the dramatic turnaround in foreign trade se-
riously affected the very heart of the Cuban 
economy. In 1997, exports and imports were still 
below their 1989 levels, and the recovery of the terms 
of trade still seems far off. 
In order to combat these tendencies, the govern-
ment has eased many of the previous regulations; in 
particular, it has broken the State monopoly on exter-
nal trade by giving management autonomy to the 
public enterprises and allowing them to operate side-
by-side with private establishments. Export firms are 
now permitted to acquire inputs directly abroad and 
to finance Cuban producers who compete with exter-
nal suppliers. In addition, the encouragement of the 
Economic reforms and 
changes in institutions 
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inflow of foreign capital and know-how has led to 
substantial changes in the rules on foreign investment 
and ownership, as well as the establishment of fa-
vourable fiscal and customs treatment. 
Promotion of exports and deliberate reduction of 
external purchases have been the main elements in 
the balance of payments adjustment. The current ac-
count deficit was reduced from US$ 3 billion to 
US$ 428 million between 1989 and 1997. This is a 
fragile and incomplete adaptation process, however, 
as is shown by the acute dependence with regard to 
the supply of capital goods, energy products and 
other strategic inputs, as well as basic consumer 
goods. Nevertheless, there are achievements to show: 
as well as doubling exports between 1993 and 1997, 
transactions with the West have grown from less than 
20% to around two-thirds of foreign trade. 
a) Foreign investment 
In 1988 it was agreed to establish the first mixed 
enterprise in the island, to build and operate the "Sol 
Palmeras" hotel at Varadero. The organization of 
commercial associations with foreign capital speeded 
up as from 1992, and at the beginning of 1998 there 
were 317 such associations. The capital came from 
over 50 countries, with Spain, Canada, Italy, Mexico 
and France accounting for particularly large shares. 
The sectors most favoured with such investment are 
tourism, mining and the oil industry. 
In 1995 a new law was adopted to attract foreign 
investment and technology, and agreements have 
been signed with the governments of various coun-
tries for mutual protection of investments. The main 
features of this law represent a considerably more 
flexible approach compared with the previous sys-
tem, but restrictive practices or controls still exist, 
especially the case-by-case approval of projects with 
foreign participation and the hiring of Cuban person-
nel through public bodies. The recent foreign invest-
ments have helped to create some 60,000 jobs in 
various activities and over 600 foreign companies 
and commercial firms have installed offices to repre-
sent them in the country. 
b) Tourism 
In 1994, the reorganization of tourism activities 
was initiated. The previous excessive concentration 
of decisions has been reversed, and economic and 
financial autonomy has been granted to the enter-
prises set up, in order to improve their competitive-
ness. Hotel chains are free to acquire their inputs on 
either the local or the external market and they are 
participating -through financing and technical assis-
tance- in the development of a network of national 
suppliers. 
The Ministry of Tourism undertakes institutional 
promotion programmes and defines investment pol-
icy, but the hotel chains negotiate directly with for-
eign investors, who come mainly from Argentina, 
Brazil, Canada, Italy, Mexico, Spain and the United 
Kingdom. It is estimated that tourism services pro-
vide direct employment for 65,000 people. In 1998, 
the installed capacity for international tourism came 
to almost 390,000 rooms. There is a programme for 
building 27,000 more rooms per year up to the year 
2000, with the aid of foreign investment, which will 
make it possible to receive nearly two million more 
visitors. 
2. Reform and modernization of the State 
a) Redimensioning the State apparatus 
Up to 1989, the size and functions of the public 
sector were closely linked with the State's participa-
tion in planning the national economy and running 
State enterprises. Likewise, the structure of the cen-
tral government was functional to the needs of eco-
nomic integration with the members of the former 
CMEA. 
As from the 1990s, a new style of organization 
of the State began to take shape. In 1994, the number 
of ministries and central-level institutions was re-
duced from 50 to 32. The central government was 
made more compact, the new institutions were as-
signed functions in accordance with the economic re-
form process, and there was a considerable reduction 
in the central government payroll. In line with these 
new approaches, the State now plays less of a leading 
role in the economy, in accordance with the reforms 
and new objectives. 
Gradual restructuring and redimensioning of the 
production sectors to adapt enterprises to the size of 
the market, the availability of inputs, and the use of 
technologies that allow them to be competitive has 
been undertaken, involving both the reconversion of 
production activities and the closure of non-viable 
enterprises and the modernization of activities and 
better use of the available resources. The government 
now tends to form small but more efficient central 
management bodies and to delegate or decentralize 
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functions and responsibilities to the provinces and 
municipalities, as well as giving increasing manage-
ment autonomy to public enterprises. Without preju-
dice to the foregoing, an effort is also being made to 
share out the burdens of the crisis and maintain the 
social safety nets. However, the external bottleneck 
has caused the authorities to establish strict direct 
controls on the allocation of foreign exchange and 
strategic inputs. 
At the same time, with the dual purpose of 
speeding up structural change and equitably sharing 
the benefits and costs of the adjustment, special in-
centive arrangements have been set up for over 1.4 
million workers (as at the beginning of 1998), espe-
cially in export activities and those efficiently replac-
ing exports. 
b) Financial reform 
The financial reform process is only just begin-
ning to adapt this sector to the changes in the real 
sector of the economy, in economic relations with the 
exterior, and in individual and collective property 
rights. Institutional reforms are being made which are 
designed to create and strengthen financial markets 
and institutions in order to improve the mobilization 
of savings and channel them to investment and the 
recovery of production. Measures are thus being 
taken to create a financial system made up of banks, 
non-bank intermediaries and capital markets. 
In 1993, as the first step in the reform of the 
financial system, it was made legal to possess foreign 
exchange and, subsequently, to open bank savings 
accounts in convertible currencies. Next, money 
changing offices and other financial intermediaries 
were set up. Among the latter, special mention may 
be made of the formation of banks or financial 
institutions specializing in serving and integrating 
the production circuits connected with the recon-
struction of foreign trade and the development of in-
struments to provide support for trade with the West. 
Finally, foreign banks have been given the possibility 
of participating in the economy and already have a 
dozen offices representing them. The same has oc-
curred in the case of other financial services, such as 
insurance. 
The above-mentioned changes mark the begin-
ning of more profound changes in financial institu-
tions in order to adapt them to the results of the 
economic shifts taking shape in Cuba. Mention may 
be made, in this respect, of the publication in 1997 of 
decrees setting up the Central Bank of Cuba and 
the commercial banking system and regulating the 
establishment and functioning of banks and non-bank 
financial institutions. Cuba has thus broken with the 
system of having only a single banking entity and has 
opened up the way for the tripartite system which 
prevails in the market economies: a Central Bank, a 
commercial banking system, and an investment bank-
ing system. 
3. The labour market 
In 1989 the employment situation was favourable, 
although the jobs available were not always of high 
productivity. In the 1990s, the crisis and structural 
changes have reduced employment in the public sec-
tor and increased the number of jobs in non-State 
activities. Private own-account employment has 
increased, but it is still subject to restrictions: own-
account enterprises cannot hire paid staff and in prac-
tice are excluded from bank credit. Moreover, tax 
policy has become very severe with respect to these 
businesses, leading to discouragement and the 
closure of many of them, with the consequent loss of 
opportunities for creating income and jobs. 
Although wage reforms are still pending and 
workers have lost purchasing power, efforts have 
been made to share the costs of the adjustment as 
equitably as possible. Thus, various measures have 
been taken to keep up employment in para-State en-
terprises and to maintain the incomes of workers who 
are technically redundant, in an effort to relieve the 
immediate social costs which are the inevitable coun-
terpart of the long-term benefits of the production 
adjustment process. Workers who lose their jobs re-
ceive a State guarantee of 100% of their wages dur-
ing the first month and subsequently benefits 
equivalent to 60% of their basic wages for a period 
which depends on their number of years of service. 
There are also enterprises which keep their workers 
standing by for technical or social reasons, continu-
ing to pay them their full wages. 
The economic duality of markets and prices is 
reflected in the duality of the net remuneration (but 
not the wages) of the labour force. The real wages of 
public employees in the central sector have deterio-
rated, but workers in high-priority activities (exports, 
energy products, foodstuffs) receive supplementary 
income in the form of incentives for raising produc-
tivity and generating or saving foreign exchange. 
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Thus, one of the dilemmas of the Cuban economy is 
how to generalize the incentives currently received 
by only part of the working population, which have 
led to a certain amount of migration of workers who 
do not enjoy such incentives towards areas of modern 
activities, such as tourist services. 
4. Macroeconomic reforms 
a) Fiscal reforms 
The tax reform process is being applied only 
gradually because of the enormous administrative de-
mands it poses and the lack of previous practical ex-
perience in taxing individual persons and enterprises. 
The previous taxes are being replaced by taxes simi-
lar to those used in the West and the tax on money 
circulation will be replaced by a sales tax. By mid-
1998, all State enterprises had been incorporated into 
the new tax system. 
Among the main purposes of the 1994 Tax Sys-
tem Act are those of protecting the lowest-income 
social strata, stimulating work and production, and 
helping to eliminate excess liquidity. Two direct taxes 
have been established: a 35% tax on company profits 
and a progressive tax on personal income. Revenue 
from the tax on profits increased five-fold between 
1995 and 1998, while the second tax concentrated on 
own-account commercial activities and, since 1996, 
on the foreign exchange income of certain types of 
professionals. 
In May 1997 it was made legal to rent real estate 
and a tax was established which is calculated on 
the basis of the characteristics of the property rented. 
It is estimated that 20% of tourists, excluding non-
resident Cubans, stay in private houses. 
The gradual application of this Act has resulted 
in an increase in the taxes paid by the non-State 
sector and the population in general. In 1995, these 
two sectors accounted for 6.7% of total tax revenue, 
but in the following year their contribution was 9%, 
and this increased to 9.4% in 1997. This figure is still 
below the potential contribution of the private sector, 
particularly because many of the non-State produc-
tion activities are in the cooperative agricultural 
sector, which has not yet been incorporated into the 
new tax system. 
b) The monetary system 
In the monetary field, the parallel foreign ex-
change market was legalized, as was the opening of 
foreign-currency savings accounts in Cuban banks. A 
system of "foreign exchange recovery shops" was 
also set up with the dual purpose of making up for 
shortcomings in national supply and syphoning-off 
excess liquidity. Thus, markets have been segmented 
and transactions are carried out in various currencies: 
Cuban pesos, U.S. dollars and, more recently, con-
vertible pesos. The State-controlled formal market, 
which receives high State subsidies, has kept the 
prices of essential consumer goods and services sta-
ble in terms of Cuban pesos. In the free markets for 
agricultural, industrial and handicraft goods, prices 
are freely fixed (in the three circulating currencies: 
Cuban pesos, convertible pesos and U.S. dollars) 
according to the fluctuations of supply and demand. 
In the foreign exchange recovery shops, prices are set 
by the government and purchases can be made in 
convertible pesos or in U.S. dollars. 
5. The planning system 
The Cuban planning system has undergone substan-
tial changes and adaptations due to the demands of 
the macroeconomic stabilization process and the 
structural changes associated with the rebuilding of 
economic links with the Western world. 
Thus, the institutional frontiers separating the 
public and private sectors have been changing. Plan-
ning has given way to the market forces as a system 
of economic coordination. Even so, the system of 
centralized control still prevails and the public enter-
prises play a leading role in the allocation of re-
sources and the supply of most goods and services. 
The market forces are on the rise, however, furthering 
the progressive decentralization of economic activi-
ties and decisions. Consequently, there is an uneasy 
coexistence between central planning and the market 
in more and more areas of the economy. 
At the same time, the rebuilding of economic 
links with the West involves the transition from a 
broad-based growth model to another where consid-
erations of competitiveness, technical excellence and 
flexibility in adapting to markets prevail, and al-
though central planning may be appropriate for the 
first-named model, it has obvious shortcomings for 
the pursuit of intensive development, especially in 
economies which are only small and are more open to 
external trade. 
The results of the structural adaptations of the 
Cuban economy naturally display a complex picture 
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of advances and setbacks. The domestic and external 
forces sometimes favour and on other occasions 
hinder the advance and rapidity of reform efforts. 
The inevitable ups and downs of the "special pe-
riod" affected the presentation of annual plans to 
the National Assembly between 1991 and 1995. 
At the same time that emergency measures were be-
ing implemented, new forms of macroeconomic and 
microeconomic management began to be introduced 
which emphasized market relations and pursued 
stricter criteria of competitiveness and efficiency. 
This led to the adoption of hitherto non-existent 
forms of planning which made up the so-called "stra-
tegic planning" approach. 
No system of planning, or, to put it in more gen-
eral terms, no economic coordination system, is inde-
pendent of the legal and organizational framework 
within which it operates. In Cuba, the impact of new 
circumstances and urgent problems has led to the in-
itiation of a period of reconstruction of institutions 
which is still under way. So far, the institutional re-
forms and those of the planning system have ad-
vanced side-by-side, and this explains the flexibility 
and much of the success of the economic stabiliza-
tion process and some essential structural changes. 
Nevertheless, these two interdependent processes of 
change have not yet concluded and some tensions 
still persist, with no clear delineation of the division 
of labour between the State and the market in 
resource allocation or the coordination of economic 
activity. 
6. Other reforms 
a) Legalization of dual markets and family 
remittances 
Since the measures taken in mid-1993 to legal-
ize the possession of foreign exchange, family remit-
tances have assumed growing importance in the 
external sector of the Cuban economy. They supple-
ment family income and at the same time represent a 
purchasing power which helps to sustain and expand 
transactions in the free markets and the "foreign ex-
change recovery shops". Furthermore, the estab-
lishment of free markets has in itself encouraged 
production and facilitated the spread of new sources 
of income for the population. 
From a macroeconomic standpoint, although the 
multiple nature of the price system or the monetary 
circuits may have disadvantages in the longer term, it 
has made it possible to capture scarce foreign ex-
change and increase the available supply for families 
and enterprises. 
b) Changes in the agricultural sector 
Between 1959 and 1963, two agrarian reform 
laws were adopted which established a dominant 
State sector in Cuban agriculture, concentrating 
within it most of the land in the country. In 1993, 
however, it was decided to allow third parties to 
make use of the bulk of State-owned land, with the 
aim of promoting an increase in supply, decentraliz-
ing official functions and responsibilities, and reduc-
ing fiscal support. 
For this purpose, basic cooperative production 
units (BCPUs) were established, opening up the way 
to smaller-scale and more autonomous forms of or-
ganization. The far-reaching nature of the reforms 
may be gathered from the fact that two-thirds of the 
total cultivable area is now operated by non-State 
entities. The BCPUs were entrusted with 42% of 
the cultivable land for exploitation and received 
loans equivalent to the value of the equipment and 
installations. 
In 1994, "farmers' markets" in which prices are 
freely set were formally established. Markets of this 
type have been established in the 169 municipal areas 
of the country, with 29 in the city of Havana. This has 
thus given legal standing to the marketing of their 
own goods by individual peasants as well as by 
public enterprises and cooperatives, after fulfillment 
of their sales commitments to the State. In 1997, pri-
vate enterprise provided 73% of all supplies, while 
the State and co-operative sectors provided 24% and 
4%, respectively. 
The immediate effects of the change in agricul-
tural land use have been reflected in the encourage-
ment of production, the creation of independent 
sources of employment, and the incipient formation 
of new entrepreneurs. The experiment has not yet 
reached maturity, and it faces the risks associated 
with every agrarian reform process, which are magni-
fied in the case of Cuba by the crisis, the over-
mechanization of agriculture in the previous period, 
the lack of management experience, shortcomings in 
the supply of essential inputs and spare parts, and 
forms of ownership which do not fully encourage 
reinvestment, technological innovation, or the care 
of natural resources (Demsetz, 1967; Coase (éd.), 
1988). 
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III 
Final comments 
There are still major problems which affect the evo-
lution of the Cuban economy and society and are 
likely to continue to do so. The microeconomic ad-
vances have been concentrated in the production of 
marketable goods, and the capital formation process 
has considerably declined, as have the standards of 
maintenance of enterprises and the infrastructure, just 
at the time when technical reconversion needs are at 
their highest. The reorganization schemes for agricul-
tural producers and industry are far from consolidated 
(this is particularly so in the case of many of the 
agricultural cooperatives and the industrial plants 
which have not redimensioned their operations or 
corrected overmanning); as occurred in 1996 with the 
overheating of the economy, the external bottleneck, 
which has only partly been solved, imposes strict 
limits on the attainable growth rates, and the gap be-
tween social security income and expenditure has 
widened since 1989, as benefits are granted inde-
pendently of the payroll-based revenue collected. 
Demographic phenomena (such as population 
ageing and the high proportion of pensioners com-
pared with the active labour force), together with the 
financial needs referred to in the previous paragraph, 
reduce the budgetary funds available for investment 
and modernization of production to a level below that 
which is advisable, and this is why it is so important 
to review the whole set of pension systems and social 
safety nets. 
Now that the stabilization phase of the "special 
period" has been completed, the country is facing a 
parting of the ways with regard to its future evolu-
tion, which is so intrinsically complex that only a 
broad sketch of a general nature can be attempted. 
One option would be to limit the liberalization of the 
"second economy" and halt the strengthening of 
private property rights, which would make it possible 
to prevent the subsequent segmentation of society or 
the dispersion of political and economic power. The 
drawbacks of this approach are equally clear, how-
ever: lower rates of development, a reduction in the 
innovative impulses for growth, and a dangerous pro-
longation of the period of inevitable economic and 
social changes. 
The other option would be to press on with the 
reforms and gradually eliminate the obstacles to the 
development of the "second economy". From the 
Cuban standpoint, this option would not be free from 
problems either. To begin with, it would be necessary 
to accept the gradual separation of powers between 
the State and the market, which would amount to 
changing the socialist paradigm followed so far. At 
the same time, it would be necessary to compensate 
for the tendencies towards income stratification, by 
extending the incentives currently given to the 
"second economy" to other segments of the labour 
market in order to preserve the legitimizing objec-
tives of the Cuban Welfare State. 
Contrary to what is often assumed, profound 
changes in production systems cannot be achieved 
instantaneously, nor can they be prevented from af-
fecting the social body as a whole: first of all it is 
necessary to travel the little-known and risky paths of 
the institutional transition. To make matters worse, 
Cuba does not have much room for maneuvering. 
Apart from domestic tensions, the present interna-
tional economic isolation imposes extraordinary lim-
its on the attainable rate of national reconstruction. 
For these reasons, in order to carry through the re-
form effort this must be carried out gradually, without 
trying to follow a straight line but instead following a 
zigzag path. The recent increase in the tax burden on 
private own-account activities shows that there are 
domestic tensions, while the United States embargo 
illustrates those of foreign origin. 
A distinction must be made here between radical 
strategies of structural change which can be put into 
effect immediately and the slower rate of evolution of 
institutional changes. It is perfectly possible to de-
regulate external trade or unify exchange markets 
overnight, but this might be incompatible with the 
more gradual process of reorganization and reconver-
sion of production at the microeconomic level or the 
acceptance by society of new values or greater sacri-
fices in the short term. 
As already noted, the reform drive in Cuba has 
arisen mainly in response to disturbances of external 
origin which called for curative strategies imposed 
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from above after a period of consultations with popu-
lar-level organizations. It therefore displays the ambi-
guity typical of profound reform processes, many of 
whose objectives will only be attained as progress is 
made in the solution of the inevitable political ten-
sions and rigidities. 
This is not to deny the need for the gradual elimi-
nation of flagrant economic distortions and the adoption 
of a new set of reforms; it merely emphasizes the need 
to choose the short- and long-term priorities very care-
fully and to appraise with caution the rate at which 
institutional changes can reasonably be applied. 
At all events, the future of Cuba is not con-
fined within the classical dichotomies of capital-
ism or socialism. There are many different paths 
open, as is shown by the different balances be-
Coase, R. (ed.) (1998): The Firm, the Market and the Law, 
Chicago, IL, Chicago University Press. 
Demsetz, H. (1967): Toward a theory of property rights, 
The American Economic Review, No. 57, Washing-
ton, D. C , The American Economic Association, 
May. 
tween efficiency, equity and growth reached in 
Northern Europe, the Pacific Rim countries, or 
Costa Rica in Latin America. 
So far, we have mainly reviewed the domestic 
options and conditioning factors for the economic 
transition and the reinsertion of Cuba into Western 
markets. In an interdependent world, however, na-
tional decisions are affected by increasingly impor-
tant outside influences. For this reason, the rate of 
the Cuban reform process and some of its features 
will be subject to the reactions and responses of the 
international community, expressed either in the 
form of closer relations and the settlement of dif-
ferences, or in greater separation and even mutual 
hostility. 
(Original: Spanish) 
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean) (1997): La economía cubana: reformas 
estructurales y desempeño en los noventa, Santiago, 
Chile. 
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